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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1997, Stanford University and the California Youth Authority [hereinafter 
“CYA”] conducted a biomedical research experiment on sixty-one male inmates 
from ages fourteen to eighteen.1  All of the subjects were given a drug named 
Depakote, used primarily for treating seizures and mania.2  The drug was tested to see 
if it would reduce the amount of aggressiveness in juvenile inmates.3  The possible 
side effects to such a drug include “drowsiness, nausea, indigestion and vomiting . . . 
hair loss, anxiety, depression, and a decrease in white blood cells.”4  These particular 
juveniles were selected as a target population because they had been convicted of 
violent crimes.5  While Stanford attempted to obtain consent from parents of the 
juvenile inmates, not all parents responded.6  Where parents did not respond or could 
not be found, the CYA consented for the juveniles.7  This experiment presents 
various issues in biomedical and behavioral research on human subjects in 
vulnerable populations.  The Stanford study led to such serious concerns, that the 
Governor of California asked the attorney general and inspector general to 
investigate the study’s “legal implications.”8 
                                                                
1Tracy Weber, 1997 Drug Test on Teenage Inmates Probed, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1999, at 
A1. 
2Id. 
3Neela Dasgupta, Stanford Study on Prisoners Investigated, STAN. DAILY, Aug. 19, 1999, 
available at <http://daily.stanford.org/daily98%2D99/8%2D19Y.2D1999/news/ 
newpsych19.html>. 
4Weber, supra note 1. 
5Id. 
6Dasgupta, supra note 3. 
7Id. 
8Id. 
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The most important issue presented by the Stanford study is whether children 
who are incarcerated can give voluntary, informed consent to such experiments.9  
Federal regulations govern biomedical and behavioral research on human subjects.10  
These regulations give separate additional protections to both children and 
prisoners.11  However, there are no regulations specifically covering the area of 
biomedical and behavioral research on juvenile prisoners or inmates.  This is an 
especially vulnerable class of individuals to target for conducting biomedical and 
behavioral research.  Voluntary informed consent is an essential element to any type 
of research, and when dealing with juvenile inmates as subjects, that consent is more 
difficult to obtain.  Yet biomedical and behavioral research is still conducted on this 
population, as evidenced by the 1997 Stanford University study.12 
The question that will be addressed here is whether juvenile inmates can 
voluntarily give informed consent to participate in biomedical and behavioral 
research.  Further, can juvenile inmates act voluntarily in the midst of coercion used 
by researchers to persuade the subjects to participate, and coercion that is inherent in 
the nature of being a juvenile inmate?  Can consent be informed when a juvenile 
inmate’s comprehension and understanding of what biomedical and behavioral 
research entails is limited by age and maturity level?  Finally, even if juvenile 
inmates are deemed capable to give voluntary informed consent to biomedical and 
behavioral research, is simply participating in such research violative of their 
constitutional rights?  
This note begins briefly by defining biomedical and behavioral research 
according to the federal regulations.  Then, the development and history behind the 
federal regulations is highlighted to show the origin of the current form of the 
regulations.  This development includes an examination of the current form of the 
regulations, which illustrates the general provisions and their application to 
biomedical and behavioral research on human subjects.  This section on the general 
provisions covers what is termed an Institutional Review Board [hereinafter “IRB”], 
informed consent standards, and possible sanctions for noncompliance. 
Following the section on general provisions is an analysis of two specific 
provisions that add protections for vulnerable classes of persons as research subjects.  
These two additional protections are for children and prisoners.  Before there can be 
an investigation into research on juvenile inmates, there must first be a description of 
the additional protections provided for children and prisoners.  The provision that 
relates to children is examined first, and covers definitions, minimal risk standards, 
and parental consent attached to informed consent standards.  Following the section 
on children is the section on adult prisoners, which covers definitions, additional 
provisions for IRBs, and avoidance of coercion.   
Finally, there will be an analysis of biomedical and behavioral research on 
juvenile inmates and the specific problems that are entailed.  This section covers 
reasons why this is a particularly vulnerable population to research, with problems of 
informed consent and coerced choices.  There is also an examination of the juvenile 
                                                                
9Weber, supra note 1. 
10See generally 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (1999). 
11See generally §§ 46.301, 46.401. 
12Weber, supra note 1. 
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inmates’ constitutional rights when participating in research.  Then the two 
additional provisions on children and prisoners are combined to see how they may 
apply to juvenile inmates.  This section will conclude with the various troubles 
created by the regulations when applied to juvenile inmates.   
II.  WHAT IS BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH? 
Biomedical and behavioral research involves many types of research.  Research, 
for purposes of the federal regulations, is broadly defined by 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 as 
“a systematic investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation, 
designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.”13  Research may also 
be classified as a clinical investigation.14  A clinical investigation is defined by 21 
C.F.R. § 50.3 as “any experiment that involves a test article and one or more human 
subjects and . . . is subject to . . . the Food and Drug Administration.”15  The 
definitions of research and clinical investigation, when combined, subject almost 
every type of research to the authority of the federal regulations.16 
Biomedical and behavioral research is conducted for many purposes.  An 
argument could be made that such research is too necessary for any sort of 
regulation.  Human experimentation has had many successes that are widely 
recognized.17  It has enabled scientists to further “medical understanding” and 
“unlock knowledge that may profoundly change the nature of our existence.”18 
Despite these accomplishments, various arguments have been made against the 
use of human subjects for biomedical and behavioral research.  These arguments 
directly conflict with the goals and objectives of the researchers conducting the 
experiments.  Researchers argue that research or human experimentation is useful, or 
for the “common good.”19  There is a difference between the interests promoted by 
research (the researcher’s motivations) and interests that are at stake due to the 
research (the interests of the human subject).  The researcher is interested in 
discovery, accomplishment and recognition.  By contrast, the human subject is 
interested in rewards for participating, taking part in improving medicine, and 
                                                                
1345 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (1999) (“Activities which meet this definition constitute research 
for purposes of this policy, whether or not they are conducted or supported under a program 
which is considered research for other purposes.”). 
1421 C.F.R. § 50.3(c) (1999). 
15Id. 
16Dale L. Moore, Recurrent Issues in the Review of Medical Research on Human Subjects, 
1 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, at 4 (1991) (“Indeed, even a relatively mundane endeavor, such as 
a study of nurses’ attitudes toward hospital patients who happen to be physicians, is research if 
it is designed to collect data that will contribute to generalizable knowledge.”). 
17Kevin M. King, A Proposal For The Effective International Regulation of Biomedical 
Research Involving Human Subjects, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 163, 166 (1998). 
18Id. (stating that biomedical and behavioral research has also awarded us with the 
“eradication of smallpox and polio”). 
19Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the Ethics of 
Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAW. 455, 467 (1996).  See generally DONALD EVANS & MARTYN 
EVANS, A DECENT PROPOSAL, ETHICAL REVIEW OF CLINICAL RESEARCH (1996); ETHICAL 
ISSUES IN RESEARCH (Darwin Cheney, ed., 1993). 
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avoiding physical harm or pain and suffering.  Whose interests are being looked out 
for in research where human subjects undergo pain and suffering in exchange for 
biomedical advances in medicine? 
III.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
There is a long history of biomedical and behavioral research conducted on 
human subjects worldwide.  However, only in the twentieth century has concern 
developed over the abuse of research on human subjects.20  In 1932, Japan began to 
experiment on thousands of people in China, including American prisoners of war, to 
test germ warfare.21  Also, in 1946, several Nazi German officials were tried in 
Nuremberg, Germany for conducting “medical experiments on men, women, and 
children in concentration camps.”22  From 1932 to 1972, over 400 black men were 
exposed to syphilis in an experiment, referred to as the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Experiment, sponsored by the U.S. Public Health Service.23  Following these 
twentieth century abuses of experimentation, there arose a demand for regulation of 
experimentation involving human subjects.  The federal regulations were created in 
1974 and have been amended several times since.24 
The federal regulations that have been adopted come from the Food and Drug 
Administration [hereinafter “FDA”] and the Department of Health and Human 
Services [hereinafter “DHHS”], titles 21 and 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
respectively.25  Many other departments and agencies that experiment or conduct 
research on human subjects have adopted these regulations as the “Common Rule.”26  
Some state laws have even begun to model the federal regulations.  From 1975 to 
1990, the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene has issued regulations that 
match those of the federal regulations.27  These federal regulations are, themselves, a 
model of a body of law, the Nuremberg Code. 
                                                                
20Garnett, supra note 19, at 465.  
21Jonathan D. Moreno, Lessons Learned: A Half-Century of Experimenting on Humans, 59 
HUMANIST 9 (1999) available at 1999 WL 3645408 (pagination unavailable).  See also 
Garnett, supra note 19, at 464.  
22Moreno, supra note 21. 
23Id. See generally JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD, THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT 
(1981).  
24Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation: 
Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L. REV. 67, 71 
(1986). 
25Id. 
26Tom Puglisi, Congressional Testimony on Suspension of Medical Research, Federal 
Document Clearing House, Inc. (April 21, 1999), available at 1999 WL 16946495. 
27John M. Oldham, et al., Symposium: “Conducting Medical Research on the Decisionally 
Impaired” Regulating Research With Vulnerable Populations: Litigation Gone Awry, 1 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 154, 156-60 (1998).  
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The FDA and the DHHS have borrowed some of the main principles of the 
Nuremberg Code, and have included them in the federal regulations.28  The 
Nuremberg Code is the “first known attempt to establish international legal 
guidelines for regulating research on humans.”29  The general principle emphasized 
by the Code was that the importance of research and the gathering of scientific 
knowledge could not outweigh the individual rights of subjects.30  The most 
important idea borrowed from the Nuremberg Code is that “voluntary consent of the 
human subject is absolutely essential.”31  In addition to the FDA and the DHHS 
regulations, the Nuremberg Code is binding upon researchers in the United States.32 
The federal regulations have the force of law and are binding on all researchers.33  
Title 21, part 50 only applies to clinical investigations regulated by the FDA, as 
defined above.34  Title 45, part 46 covers “all research involving human subjects 
conducted, supported or otherwise subject to regulation by any federal department or 
agency….”35  This coverage, however, is limited only to federally funded or 
supported research.36  There are also certain situations in which the regulations will 
not apply at all.37  The majority of these exempted types of research deal with 
research held in educational settings or involving cognitive tests.38  Furthermore, 
“department or agency heads may waive the applicability of some or all of the 
provisions” set forth in these regulations for research activities, as they deem 
necessary.39  Thus, it is questionable as to how much coverage the regulations 
actually have over biomedical and behavioral research. 
                                                                
28Samuel Jan Brakel, Considering Behavioral and Biomedical Research on Detainees in 
the Mental Health Unit of an Urban Mega-Jail, 22 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 1, 6 (1996). 
29King, supra note 17, at 168. 
30Moreno, supra note 21. 
31The Nuremberg Code, reprinted in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN 
SUBJECTS: FACING THE 21ST CENTURY 431-32 (Harold Y. Vanderpool, ed., 1996). 
32In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 796, 821 (S.D. Ohio 1995). 
33See generally 42 U.S.C. § 289(a) (1999) (“[t]he secretary shall by regulation require” an 
Institutional Review Board “to review biomedical and behavioral research involving human 
subjects”). 
3421 C.F.R. § 50.1(a) (1999). 
3545 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1999). 
36Robert J. Katerberg, Note, Institutional Review Boards, Research on Children, and 
Informed Consent of Parents: Walking the Tightrope Between Encouraging Vital 
Experimentation and Protecting Subjects’ Rights, 24 J.C. & U.L. 545, 549 (1998). 
3745 C.F.R. § 46.101(b) (1999). 
38Id. (exempting these types of research: (i) research conducted in commonly accepted 
educational settings, (ii) research involving the use of educational tests, (iii) research involving 
publicly available documents and records of existing data, (iv) research which is meant to 
examine public benefit or service programs, and (v) research involving taste and food quality 
evaluation). 
3945 C.F.R. § 46.101(i) (1999). 
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Title 42, section 289 of the United States Code requires that there be a regulation 
in force which in turn will require an IRB for the purpose of reviewing “biomedical 
and behavioral research involving human subjects.”40  The IRB has the “authority to 
approve, require modifications in, or disapprove all research activities” covered by 
the regulations.41  The IRB fulfills its duties by: (i) ensuring that risks to subjects are 
minimal, (ii) reviewing informed consent documents and the procedures used to 
obtain consent, (iii) reviewing the selection of subjects, (iv) balancing the risks with 
the benefits derived from the research, and  (v) providing that the subjects’ privacy is 
protected.42  If all of these criteria are satisfied then the research is approved by the 
IRB.  The IRB must also meet member requirements, according to 45 C.F.R. § 46.  
Every IRB must have five members who are diversified by gender and race.43  One 
member must be a person with scientific concerns, another must have concerns in a 
nonscientific area, and there must be at least one member who is not affiliated with 
the institution conducting the research.44 
There are three main interests that an IRB must consider when deciding whether 
to approve a specific research experiment.45  They are the interests of: (1) the 
researchers or investigators, (2) the institution supporting the research, and (3) the 
research subjects.46  As to the latter, “the subject’s own health and well-being, which 
are directly and foreseeably affected by the research, make the subject the most 
vulnerable of the three parties.”47  In all, the IRB has the challenge of taking all three 
interests into consideration and balancing them so that the private rights involved are 
never underestimated.  
As stated, the FDA and DHHS have borrowed from the Nuremberg Code the 
idea that voluntary informed consent is necessary for research.48  Informed consent 
must be “documented by the use of a written consent form approved by the IRB and 
signed by the subject.”49  45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) provides researchers with eight 
general requirements to satisfy voluntary informed consent.50  Those requirements are 
as follows: 
(1) A statement of what the research involves, and information on its 
duration, procedures, and purposes; 
                                                                
4042 U.S.C. § 289(a) (1999) (stating that statute is also for the purpose of protecting the 
rights of human subjects). 
4145 C.F.R. § 46.109(a) (1999).  
42§ 46.111.  See also Moore, supra note 16, at 8-9. 
4345 C.F.R. § 46.107(a)-(f).  
44Id. (requiring that no member may serve on the IRB if he/she has a conflict of interest).  
45Moore, supra note 16, at 12-13.  
46Id.  
47Id. 
48See 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (1999); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1999). 
4945 C.F.R. § 46.117(a) (1999). 
50§ 46.116.  See also Puglisi, supra note 26; Delgado, supra note 24. 
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(2) A statement of “any reasonably foreseeable risks” to the subject; 
(3) A statement of “any benefits to the subject or to others”; 
(4) A disclosure of alternative procedures if available; 
(5) A statement explaining “confidentiality of records”; 
(6) When “more than a minimal risk” is involved, a statement explaining 
any compensation or medical treatment that would be available if 
injury were to occur; 
(7) A statement of whom to contact for any questions the research subject 
might have; 
(8) A statement informing subjects “that participation is voluntary” and 
“they may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or 
loss of benefits.”51 
Both the FDA and the DHHS prohibit the use of exculpatory clauses in obtaining 
informed consent.52  These provisions specifically prohibit “any language through 
which the subject . . . is made to waive or appear to waive any of the subject’s legal 
rights, or releases or appears to release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution or 
its agents from liability for negligence.”53 
The federal regulations reach some but not all biomedical and behavioral 
research, and provide for sanctions when they are not followed.  There are only two 
sections within the regulations that provide for remedies or penalties for violations of 
the regulations.  45 C.F.R. § 46.113 provides that an IRB may suspend or terminate 
research that is not “conducted in accordance with the IRB’s requirements.”54  The 
other, 45 C.F.R. § 46.123, provides that a “department or agency head” may 
terminate any funding or support provided by that specific agency or department for 
failure to comply with the regulations.55 
There are a number of deficiencies in these regulations and the requirements for 
informed consent.56  The DHHS provides the IRB with great discretion for granting 
                                                                
51Id.; see also § 46.116(b) (delineating other elements of information that may be required 
to be included with informed consent:  (i) a statement that the treatment will invoke risks 
which are currently unforeseeable, (ii) anticipated circumstances by which the experiment may 
be terminated, (iii) additional costs to the subject, (iv) consequences of a subject’s decision to 
withdraw from the procedures, (v) statement of any additional findings during the research 
experiment, and (vi) the number of other subjects involved in the research project). 
52See 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (1999); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1999). 
5321 C.F.R. § 50.20 (1999); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1999). 
5445 C.F.R. § 46.113 (1999).  
55§ 46.123.  
56Delgado, supra note 24, at 75-76.  
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broad waivers to the requirement of informed consent.57  The requirement to obtain 
informed consent may be waived when the “research could not practicably be carried 
out without the waiver or alteration.”58  The IRB may also waive the requirements for 
informed consent when “the research involves no more than minimal risk to the 
subjects,” “the waiver . . . will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the 
subjects,” and “when the subjects will be provided with additional pertinent 
information after participation.”59  This leaves the IRB with many ways to approve 
the research without requiring informed consent. 
In addition to the above general regulations, the DHHS has recognized the need 
to provide additional protections for human subjects belonging to a vulnerable class 
of people.60  Vulnerable classes of subjects can include children, prisoners, pregnant 
women, and handicapped or mentally disabled persons.61  The classes of children and 
prisoners are the focus here.  
IV.  BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH ON CHILDREN 
The regulations define “children” as “persons who have not attained the legal age 
for consent to treatments or procedures involved in the research, under the applicable 
law of the jurisdiction in which the research will be conducted.”62  This definition 
leaves to the states the discretion to apply their own “legal age for consent” 
according to state laws.  The result is that the additional protections for children 
contained in the federal regulations do not apply to certain children due to the state 
laws that set the age of legal consent at a young age.63 
From a researcher’s perspective, a test population of children is an ideal group to 
target for research.  Some argue that research or experimentation on children is 
necessary, because the problems and illnesses studied in children are specific to 
children.64  Examples of problems studied in children that are age specific are 
childhood autism and suicidal adolescent depression.65  Genetic research on children 
is also a benefit since it allows researchers to identify genetic diseases and early 
development in humans.66  Inherent in genetic research is the process of determining 
the genetic traits children develop as they mature.67 
                                                                
5745 C.F.R. § 46.116(c)-(d) (1999).  
58§ 46.116(c)(2); 46.116(d)(3).  
59§ 46.116(d)(1); 46.116(d)(2); 46.116(d)(4).   
60§ 46.107(a).  
61Id.  
62§ 46.402(a).  
63Katerberg, supra note 36, at 558.  
64Garnett, supra note 19, at 484.  
65Oldham, supra note 27, at 171. 
66Allen J. Wilcox, et al., Genetic Determinism and the Overprotection of Human Subjects, 
21 NATURE GENETICS 362 (1999).  
67Id.  
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Subpart D of title 45, part 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides the 
protections for children, as subjects of research, that are in addition to the general 
regulations on all research involving human subjects.68  The regulations specific to 
children are based on the concept of “minimal risk.”69  “Minimal risk” is defined by 
45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) as when “the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort 
anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily 
encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or 
psychological examinations or tests.”70  The major problem with the standard is that it 
likens ordinary, daily activities in a child’s life with the activities that are conducted 
under research.71  One example of the defect of this standard applies where children 
who are chronically ill receive ongoing treatments for their medical condition.  These 
children are probed and exposed to different types of medicine with side effects, on a 
“daily” and “routine” basis, to treat their medical condition.72  Under this minimal 
risk standard, researchers will be able to probe or expose these children to 
experimental drugs with the same or similar side effects as those which are used in 
the children’s medical treatment.  The reason for this is that the research will not 
pose a higher risk than what these children are already experiencing.73  The standard 
of minimal risk, which is the basis of the additional protections for children, is 
unworkable with such defects. 
The DHHS divides the research to be approved by IRBs into three main 
categories:  
(1) Where no greater than minimal risk to children is presented; 
(2) Where greater than minimal risk to children is presented, as long as a 
direct benefit to the individual subjects is also presented; 
(3) Where greater than minimal risk to children is presented with no 
direct benefit, as long as the research is likely to yield generalizable 
knowledge about the subjects’ disorder or condition.74 
As to the first category, when research involves no greater than a minimal risk, then 
the research will be permitted.75  In the second category, as long as there is an 
anticipated benefit to the subjects, the research will be permitted regardless of the 
                                                                
6845 C.F.R. § 46.401(a) (1999).  
69Katerberg, supra note 36, at 555.  
7045 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (1999).  
71Lainie Friedman Ross, Feature, Children as Research Subjects: A Proposal to Revise the 
Current Federal Regulations Using a Moral Framework, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 159, 162 
(1997) (“[c]hildren commonly encounter experiences at school that threaten their self-image, 
but this does not justify similar threats in the research setting.”).  
72Id. 
73Id. 
74See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.404-06 (1999).  
75§ 46.404.  
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magnitude of the risk involved.76  The third category extends the researchers’ ability 
to research on children by permitting research that will yield at least generalizable 
knowledge, even if it does not present an outright benefit to the subjects.77  This last 
category is a prime example of how researchers’ interests may be given more weight 
than those of the individual subjects.  
In addition to these three categories of research involving different levels of risk, 
45 C.F.R. § 46.407 goes even further to approve research on children that is not 
otherwise approved by the three categories specified.78  Even if the research does not 
yield generalizable knowledge specific to the individual subject, as long as the 
research “presents responsible opportunity to further the understanding, prevention, 
or alleviation of a serious problem affecting the health or welfare of [all] children,” 
then the research will be permitted (no risk level is specified).79  Since most research 
conducted on children points to this purpose as the end to be achieved, it could be 
approved by IRBs on all occasions.80 
Another major problem with researching on children that the regulations attempt 
to address is whether children can give informed consent.81  45 C.F.R. § 46.408(a) 
provides that a child research subject must “assent” to participation in the experiment 
whenever the IRB decides on account of age, maturity, and psychological state that 
the child subject may give such assent.82  However, assent may be waived as not 
necessary by the IRB in two circumstances: (1) where “the capability of some or all 
of the children is so limited that they cannot reasonably be consulted,” or (2) where 
“the intervention or procedure involved in the research holds out a prospect of direct 
benefit that is important to the health or well-being of the children and is available 
only in the context of research.”83 
In addition to requiring assent from the child subject where appropriate, 45 
C.F.R. § 46.408(b) requires that “adequate provisions are made for soliciting the 
permission of each child’s parents or guardian.”84  “Parent” is defined by the 
regulations as “a child’s biological or adoptive parent.”85  “Guardian” is defined as 
“an individual who is authorized under applicable state or local law to consent on 
behalf of a child to general medical care.”86  Since states and localities may determine 
                                                                
76§ 46.405.  
77§ 46.406. 
78§ 46.407.  
79§ 46.407(a).  
80See Garnett, supra note 19, at 484; Oldham, supra note 27, at 171.  
81Delgado, supra note 24, at 94.  
8245 C.F.R. § 46.408(a) (1999).  See also § 46.402(b) (“’Assent’ means a child’s 
affirmative agreement to participate in research.”).  
83§ 46.408(a).  See also Ross, supra note 71, at 164 (noting that age seven had been 
designated by the National Commission as the age at which a child’s assent is required 
because most children over the age of seven have some understanding of the research).  
8445 C.F.R. § 46.408(b) (1999).  
85§ 46.402(d).  
86§ 46.402(e).  
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who qualifies as a guardian, the number and type of people who may give permission 
for the child to participate is overly broad.  State or local laws may permit next of 
kin, friends, or even neighbors who know the child well to give consent. 
These provisions allow the parent or guardian’s permission to override the child’s 
refusal or objection to assent to the research.87  When the child is not required to give 
assent according to 45 C.F.R. § 46.408(a) because it is deemed unnecessary, the 
parent may still give permission to proceed with the research.88  This seems 
detrimental to a child’s personal autonomy.89  Informed consent is the standard used 
to justify experimentation on human subjects, because giving consent protects 
autonomy.90  It is thus often argued that “proxy consent” is an oxymoron because it 
bypasses the principle behind informed consent, which is to recognize self-
determination and autonomy.91  It could also be argued that a parent’s responsibility 
to his or her child is a fiduciary one and, in certain cases, permission to let the child 
participate in biomedical and behavioral research may be a breach of that duty.92 
The DHHS also provides that the requirement for the parent or guardian’s 
permission may be waived in certain circumstances.93  The requirement for parental 
permission is waived when the IRB determines that parental or guardian permission 
is an unreasonable requirement for the protection of the individual child subject.94  
The regulations provide examples where these types of waivers will occur, such as 
when the parents are neglectful or abusive to the children.95  Also, whenever the 
general waivers to the requirement of informed consent occur due to the exemption 
provisions in 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b), viz., cognitive tests in educational settings, 
public benefit and service programs, etc., there is no need to acquire either the 
parent’s or guardian’s permission or the child’s assent to research.96 
Furthermore, informed consent may be given without parental permission if the 
minor is emancipated.97  Emancipated minors are those “adolescents who are entitled 
to give legal consent because of their status,” which includes being a “mature minor” 
according to state law, married or parenting adolescents, and college students living 
away from home.98  A “mature minor” is a person of juvenile age, but who exhibits 
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an understanding of the research and its procedures.99  Some states specify that a 
child is a mature minor by age; others take into account the child’s level of 
comprehension of the risks and benefits as a deciding factor.100  Also, there is an 
argument known as the “babysitter test,” which incorporates the idea that a babysitter 
(a child who is mature enough to supervise younger children) should also be held as 
mature enough to give informed legal consent to participation in research.101 
V.  BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH ON ADULT PRISONERS 
The DHHS defines “prisoner” as “any individual involuntarily confined or 
detained in a penal institution.”102  This broad definition covers individuals sentenced 
under both criminal and civil statutes.103  Prisoners have been targeted as research 
populations in the United States extensively since the end of World War II.104  The 
United States was actually the only Western nation continuing to conduct biomedical 
and behavioral research on prisoners after the Nuremberg Trials.105  Prisoner research 
has decreased substantially over the years, but it still remains in certain locations 
across the United States.106 
Researchers continue to target prisoners as a research population due to the 
various benefits that result to the researchers and institutions that conduct the 
experiments.  It has been argued by many that prisons are an almost ideal location 
for conducting research because they consist of routine life subject to few 
variations.107  That is, prison life is already controlled for the researcher.  Prisoners 
eat the same food, sleep at the same times, and partake in the same types of 
activities.  Researchers also argue that it is less burdensome on prisoners to be 
subject to any sort of research compared to those who are not incarcerated.108  
Another reason why conducting research on prisoners is so desirable is that 
researchers can pay less money to carry out experiments since prisoners can be paid 
substantially less than other subjects who are not incarcerated.109 
Additional protections are placed on research on prisoners by Subpart C of title 
45, part 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations.110  The purpose of these protections is 
“to provide additional safeguards for the protection of prisoners involved in” 
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biomedical and behavioral research.111  One important aspect of these additional 
protections is that they give prisoners the chance to have representation on the 
IRB.112  The regulations specific to prisoner subjects require that at least one member 
of the Board is a prisoner or a prisoner representative with the background and 
experience needed to adequately represent such prisoners.113  This representation is 
meant to give prisoners a voice for expressing their rights when decisions are made 
by the IRB. 
The IRB is also charged with other duties and determinations specific to research 
on prisoners.114  The IRB must determine that the following conditions are met before 
approving any research sought to target prisoners as subjects: 
The research is permissible under the regulations specifically relating to 
prisoners under 45 C.F.R. § 46.306(a)(2); 
The advantages of  participation in the research  are not of such a 
magnitude that a prisoner’s ability to weigh the risks of the research 
against the value of such advantages is impaired; 
The risks involved are equal to the risks that would be involved for 
persons not incarcerated;115 
All prisoner subjects are chosen equally and randomly; 
The information presented to the prisoners is clear and understandable; 
Prisoners are informed that their participation in the research will not have 
an effect on their parole; 
There is a follow-up examination when necessary for the care of 
participants after the research experiment has ended.116 
These seven considerations, that are to be determined by the IRB, are important for 
deciding whether the research is equitable and whether the prisoners are acting 
voluntarily in participating.117  The type of research conducted must fall within one of 
the four types of research permitted under § 46.306(a)(2).118  The IRB then approves 
the research by finding that it qualifies for each of the seven considerations listed 
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above.119  Under section 46.306(a)(2), the first two types of research permitted use the 
same “minimal risk” standard used in the additional protections for children.120  First, 
the regulations provide that if the research involves a “study of the possible causes, 
effects, and processes of incarceration, and of criminal behavior” and there is “no 
more than a minimal risk,” then it will be permitted.121  The second type permits any 
research on prisoners that studies “prisons as institutional structures or of prisoners 
as incarcerated persons” and that involves “no more than a minimal risk.”122 
The last two of the four types of research permitted on prisoners are very broad 
and do not involve the concept of “minimal risk.”123  The third type allows the 
conducting of research on conditions affecting prisoners as a class of persons, 
including research on social and psychological problems among inmates without any 
consideration given to “minimal risk” (like category two but without a minimal risk 
standard).124  The fourth type permits any “research on practices . . . which have the 
intent and reasonable probability of improving the health or well-being of the 
subject.”125  It has been argued that these last two types of permitted research allow a 
large spectrum of research, especially since the “minimal risk” standard is 
disregarded.126 
The regulations fail to address adequately the ability of prisoners to give 
voluntary informed consent to participation in research.  There are two extremes to 
the argument of voluntary informed consent by prisoners.127  On the one side, it is 
argued that “wholly uncoerced consent is impossible to obtain in the prison 
setting.”128  An alternative view is that “there is no such thing as an uncoerced 
decision by anyone, in prison or in the free world.”129  This would be like making an 
unmotivated decision, which is a human impossibility.130  To analyze these problems 
when it comes to prisoners making decisions on whether to participate in research, it 
is necessary to look at informed consent, separated from voluntary consent.  Even 
though the terms “informed consent” and “voluntary consent” are similar, the 
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concepts must be looked at separately.131  There can be no informed consent if the 
consent given is not also voluntary.132 
Turning first to obtaining informed consent of prisoners, recall that the fifth 
consideration for the IRB under section 46.305(a) is that information provided to the 
prisoners be understandable.133  Consent must be clear and reasonably understood by 
the prisoner without any exculpatory clauses added to the consent form.134  Consent 
forms are often difficult to read, not just by prisoners but by anyone; forms that are 
not understandable by prisoners fail to comply with the regulations.135  It has also 
been noted that when high-risk experiments are involved, additional disclosure 
should be made beyond that required by the general informed consent requirements 
in Subpart A of title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations.136  However, as 
previously noted, the only requirement added by the provision is that the prisoners 
“understand” the information provided to them about the research and procedures.137  
This simple requirement leaves room for error, especially where informed consent is 
otherwise waived according to section 46.116 of Subpart A, title 45.138 
The voluntary consent problem presents even more complications in the realm of 
prisoner research.  When it comes to research on prisoner subjects, the driving force 
that affects their ability to act voluntarily is coercion.  Coercion is often defined as a 
constraint or induced influence on the chooser.139  Here, the prisoner choosing to 
participate in research.  Coercion is a serious deprivation of a person’s rights, with 
arguments often directed towards violations of constitutional rights.140  These types of 
arguments revolve around the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution.141  The Eighth Amendment argument stems from the cruel 
and unusual punishment prohibition; it is often used to show that where a prisoner 
did not act voluntarily, the prisoner, instead, has undergone cruel and unusual 
punishment due to the harmful effects of the experiment.142  The Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments are used to argue that prisoners’ equal protection and due process 
rights have been violated.  Where prisoners are disadvantaged due to being 
incarcerated and any other coercion used by researchers, they have acted 
involuntarily and therefore should have been entitled to due process before 
                                                                
131Schroeder, supra note 104, at 973.  
132Id.  
13345 C.F.R. § 46.305(a)(5) (1999).  
134See Valenti v. Prudden, 397 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1977).  
135Schroeder, supra note 104, at 977.  
136Id. 
13745 C.F.R. § 46.305(a)(5) (1999).  
138§ 46.116 (1999).  
139M. Gregg Bloche, Beyond Autonomy: Coercion and Morality in Clinical Relationships, 
6 HEALTH MATRIX 229, 271 (1996). 
140Brakel, supra note 28, at 23-24.  
141Id.  
142Id. 
92 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 15:77 
undergoing any such research.143  Due process entitles a prisoner the reasonable 
opportunity to make a voluntary, uncoerced decision.  Prisoners, however, are 
deprived of this right from the moment they begin their sentence.  Prisoners are 
persons who are inherently coerced due to the prison environment and conditions.  
The equal protection principle is used to show that when a prisoner participates in 
research, that prisoner’s right to be treated equally with respect to “autonomy 
accorded other citizens” is violated because the prisoner was coerced.144 
There have been very few cases decided that relate to biomedical and behavioral 
research on prisoners.  Of those, the leading prison research case is Bailey v. Lally in 
which a group of former state prisoners who had participated in research medical 
tests brought a class action suit in federal court.145  They claimed that conditions of 
coercion and inducement had caused them to participate in the research 
involuntarily, which violated their constitutional rights to due process and against 
cruel and unusual punishment.146  During the time of the experiments, the prison 
where these former prisoners were serving their sentences had very poor conditions; 
there was no hot water, no heat in the winter, overcrowding (two men to a cell), 
excessive noise and sanitation problems.147  For the purpose of the research 
experiments a Medical Research Unit [hereinafter “MRU”] was established outside 
of the prison.148  The prisoners were offered money as payment for participating in 
the research project at a rate higher than they would have been able to get through 
the available prison jobs.149 
Prisoners were given the chance, if they participated, to leave the conditions of 
the prison to go to the MRU.  The MRU was adequately heated, quiet, and had hot 
water, color television, and three separate bathroom facilities.150  The researchers 
“considered a written consent form insufficient and relied on the repetitive oral 
explanations to inform the prisoners,” but would at some point later require the 
prisoners to read and sign written consent forms.151  The MRU researchers conducted 
experiments involving common infectious diseases such as the flu or common 
cold.152  None were harmed by or infected with a disease that could not be cured 
quickly; the harm that these former prisoners claimed was that they were deprived of 
their right to voluntarily choose to participate due to the inherent and extrinsic 
coercion placed on them.153 
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Neither of the constitutional claims was successful; the court stated that because 
the research was not incompatible with “the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society” and because it did not involve “the unnecessary 
and wanton infliction of pain,” the claim of violation of the Eighth Amendment must 
fail.154  Because the prisoners were informed that they could withdraw from the 
experiment at any point, the court stated that the prisoners could not have been 
subject to cruel and unusual punishment.155  As to the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
court reasoned that because the acts of the defendants did not “shock the conscience” 
of mankind, the plaintiffs were not entitled to due process.156  Since the researchers 
continuously informed the prisoners about the experiment and many prisoners were 
not attracted to undergo the experiment despite its benefits, the court found that the 
prisoners acted both voluntarily and informed.157 
There are several causes of coercion in the prison setting, some that qualify as 
inherent situational coercion and others that qualify as inducement from the 
researcher or institution supporting the research.  Monetary compensation paid to 
prisoners is one of the most common coercive tools used by researchers.158  Paying 
prisoners more money than what they could get otherwise may make participation 
seem overwhelmingly attractive and may motivate prisoners to take risks that they 
would not normally agree to take.159  However, it is also argued that if pay is so 
minimal as to be equal to or less than normal prisoner pay, then prisons will become 
the most attractive research setting because of such a low price to pay for conducting 
the research.160  Other coercive tools that are often used are:  
Separating the prisoners for the experiment, which can provide prisoners 
with better housing conditions (i.e. receiving a single cell or being able to 
participate in research outside of the institution at a medical hospital as 
opposed to living in overcrowded conditions); 
The chance to avoid less attractive prison related jobs involving hard labor 
and less attractive conditions of the prison setting, such as sanitation, 
heating, and water  (this is often referred to as “situational coercion”); 
and,  
The idea that participation will make the prisoner appear to be a better and 
improved person when his/her parole is up for review (Even though the 
prisoner might think this, recall that one of the IRB’s determinations to be 
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made is that there will be no consideration given to the participation in the 
research by the prisoner’s parole board).161   
All of these, separately or combined, can have the effect of coercing an individual 
prisoner to participate in research that he or she would not ordinarily participate.   
The DHHS’s additional protections for prisoner subjects do not place much 
weight on preventing coercion and use vague rules to try to prevent such coercion.162  
However, it is clear that the DHHS had coercion in mind when creating the 
additional protections for prisoners; the statement of purpose in 45 C.F.R. § 46.302 
recognizes that prisoners are under constraints due to their incarceration that may 
affect their ability to voluntarily consent to participation in research.163  Also, recall 
that the second determination the IRB must make is that the advantages of 
participation in the research are not of such a magnitude that a prisoner’s ability to 
weigh the value of each is impaired.164  This consideration is meant to prevent 
coercion in the prison setting.   
The FDA also does a poor job of addressing coercion used to achieve research 
regulated by that agency.165  21 C.F.R. § 50.20 requires only that the “investigator 
shall seek [to] . . . minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence.”166  This 
allows a researcher to show that coercion has been minimized where it might have 
been great before by only decreasing it by a small increment.  This small decrease in 
coercive forces would not make a difference in prison settings where coercion is an 
inherent force. 
VI.  BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH ON JUVENILE INMATES 
There are many reasons why juvenile inmates are an especially beneficial 
population of research subjects to target for conducting biomedical and behavioral 
research.  The most prominent of those reasons is that the benefits of researching on 
children and prisoners are combined. Juvenile inmates for the most part consist of 
poor urban males.167  Many of the juveniles who are detained are uneducated and 
have a great number of medical problems upon admission to the detention facility, 
ranging from sexually transmitted diseases to mental illnesses.168  These diseases give 
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researchers an opportunity to research and test possible cures and treatments. 
Something else that works to the benefit of researchers is the fact that, when 
admitted to the detention facility, most juvenile inmates need medical treatment and 
cannot afford to obtain such treatment.169  Juvenile inmates in such a situation will 
likely be willing to undergo experimental treatment if they are led to believe it will 
help them.  Researchers can test their promising drugs and cures on these children 
without having to spend money coercing them, and without obtaining “assent” 
(consent) to the research since it directly benefits the welfare of the child.170 
There are also a number of behavioral problems among juvenile inmates that 
might lead researchers to conduct experiments on this group.  Behavioral problems, 
depression and even learning disabilities are higher in juvenile inmates than other 
children.171  Antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, paranoid 
disorder, and passive-aggressive disorder are the most common personality disorders 
found among juvenile inmates.172  These are heavily researched areas of psychology, 
and therefore, juvenile inmates are one of the best sources for that research. 
There are many problems that arise with juvenile inmates who participate in 
biomedical and behavioral research that are not addressed by the federal regulations.  
One important issue that relates to juvenile inmates seeking remedies for any injury 
caused by research is the statute of limitations.173  This issue arises when side effects 
due to the research show up years after the actual experiment.174  These side effects 
are the injury resulting from the participation in the research while in prison.175  By 
the time the side effects are known by the former juvenile inmate, possibly now an 
adult, the statute of limitations may have run, which bars any claims the injured 
might otherwise be able to bring.176  What is referred to as the discovery rule is often 
the determining factor in these cases.177  Under the discovery rule, once the injured 
person discovers the injury the statute of limitations starts to run, but diligence must 
be used in discovering the critical facts of the injury.178 
One prime example of this scenario is Bibeau v. Pacific Northwest Research 
Foundation, Inc.179  In this case a former inmate, while incarcerated, participated in a 
research experiment that tested the effects of radiation on human testicular 
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function.180  Side effects from the experiment had developed some twenty years later 
causing pain to the former inmate.181  However, all of the former prisoner’s claims 
were barred by the statute of limitations.182  The plaintiff in this case had experienced 
various symptoms and ailments through his life such as severe testicular pain and 
periodic groin rash, which he had considered “common male complaints.”183  The 
plaintiff never consulted a doctor, nor did he ever think that the various symptoms 
were directly related to the experiment that had taken place years ago.184  The court 
held, according to these facts, that the plaintiff had not acted diligently in discovering 
the injury.185  This type of problem is more likely to occur with juveniles since they 
might not become aware of any injury until years later, when it might become 
comprehensible to them. 
Another problem for juvenile inmates is that there are inadequate protections 
available for them as a group under the federal regulations.  Remember that there are 
two separate additional sets of regulations for both prisoners and children created by 
the DHHS.186  In order for both of these regulatory provisions to apply to juvenile 
inmates, this class of persons must meet both the definitions given for “children” and 
“prisoner.”187  A combining of the definitions allows only individuals “involuntarily 
confined or detained in a penal institution”188 and “who have not attained the legal 
age for consent to treatments or procedures involved in the research, under the 
applicable law of the jurisdiction”189 where conducted to be covered by both 
regulations. 
There are many discrepancies that arise when the two sets of additional 
protection regulations are applied to juvenile inmates.  Recall that one protection for 
prisoners is that a prisoner is required to be a member of the IRB to give adequate 
representation of prisoners’ interests.190  If this requirement is fulfilled in the juvenile 
prisoner setting, then the prisoners’ interests could not possibly be adequately 
represented.  A child, who cannot even give “legal consent” by definition, cannot 
give reasonable input on the decisions made by the IRB on approving or 
disapproving of the research protocol.191 
Both additional protection regulations apply a “minimal risk” standard, which 
compares that risk to the “physical or psychological harm that is normally 
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encountered in the daily lives.”192  Again, this is an ambiguous standard, which does 
nothing but harm the rights of juvenile inmates.  It is ambiguous as to whether 
“minimal risk” is to be measured by the risks encountered in the daily life of an 
average, everyday person, or whether it is to be measured by the risks encountered 
by the actual subjects who are participating in the research, here being juvenile 
prisoners.193  The fact that juvenile prisoners engage in more dangerous activities and 
live in harsh social conditions, creating higher risk situations in their daily lives, 
could broaden the definition of “minimal risk.”194  If this definition becomes too 
broad, then many types of research that might have been rejected by a strict standard, 
as was intended by the regulations, would be permitted.   
The two sets of regulations also conflict in other ways.  There is a special 
provision in Subpart D of title 45, part 46, which provides the additional protections 
for research on children, that covers children who are wards of the state.195  Research 
can only be conducted upon wards of the state when related to their status as wards 
and when the majority of other children involved in the same research experiment 
are not wards.196  The second of these two requirements conflicts directly with the 
additional protections placed on prisoners.  Under 45 C.F.R. § 46.305(a) the fourth 
consideration to be made by the IRB in deciding whether to approve the research 
protocol is that the prisoner subjects be selected equally and randomly.197  Since there 
may be participants who are wards, a strong possibility in juvenile institutions, 
researchers cannot select possible participants randomly, when at the same time they 
are required to give careful consideration in making sure that there is a majority of 
prisoners who are not wards of the state.  Juvenile prisoners cannot be selected 
randomly if care must be taken to make sure that there is a majority of prisoners who 
are not wards of the state and actually have parents or guardians to consent for them.  
It may also be very difficult to choose subjects among juvenile prisoners equally 
when certain children must assent to the research, while others are not required to 
give such assent.198 
Another conflict between the two sets of regulatory protections revolves around 
the issue of informed consent.  The additional protections for prisoners require, in the 
fifth consideration made by the IRB, that information be provided to the subject 
population in a way that is understandable to the subjects.199  This poses a problem 
when dealing with juvenile inmates who, due to their maturity level, may have a hard 
time understanding and comprehending certain information.  While strictly adhering 
to this requirement could prevent all research on juvenile inmates, several states that 
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carry “mature minor” laws may still permit research on these juveniles.200  These laws 
allow children to give informed consent to medical treatment when they have 
attained such early ages as fourteen or fifteen.201  Sometimes these “mature minor” 
laws permit a child, who can exhibit a competency to understand the research and its 
procedures, to be the deciding factor of legal age to give informed consent, rather 
than allowing consent dependent on the age of the minor.202  In a study conducted on 
researchers, three-fourths of all of the researchers “said they would use their clinical 
judgment to evaluate whether the child had sufficient maturity to assent.”203  Given a 
researcher’s self-interest, this is too much discretion in his/her hands. 
One argument against the researcher having so much discretion is that 
researchers have a fiduciary duty to their subjects.204  The law of fiduciary duty is 
meant to protect individuals with less expertise, here the subjects, from the abuse of 
power given or delegated to the fiduciary, here the researcher or investigator.205  
Although this is a concept borrowed from the field of medical treatment, it may also 
be applied to biomedical and behavioral research, since subjects often depend on the 
researcher’s knowledge and expertise as patients depend on their physicians to assist 
them in making medical decisions.206  Researchers are associated with a class of 
individuals with superior knowledge similar to other professionals who have 
fiduciary duties.207  One important fiduciary duty is to prevent any unnecessary 
inducement or coercion to persuade the subject to participate in the research. 
Coercion is a much more difficult problem among juvenile inmates than any 
other class or group of individuals who participate in biomedical and behavioral 
research.  The same modes of coercion or influence that may be tolerated in research 
on adult prisoners would be very problematic in the experimentation on juvenile 
prisoners.208  The inducement needed to obtain consent in a vulnerable class of 
individuals is easier than that required for obtaining consent from average 
individuals.209  The more disadvantaged a class of individuals is, the less inducement 
or coercive external force is needed.210  The combination of prison life and maturity 
level of children, often with behavioral problems, makes for a very disadvantaged 
population.   
The same coercive tools can be used on juvenile inmates to induce them to 
participate in research, as on adult prisoners.  However, coercive tools can have a 
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more extreme effect on juveniles who are incarcerated.  Again, money paid to the 
prisoners is the most common inducement.211  One argument used often to address 
this problem is to offer the prisoners the same rate of pay as would be received for 
any other prisoner job or work activity.212  There are two deficiencies that make this 
suggestion flawed in its application.  The first, is that the more the pay rate is 
lowered, the more attractive the group becomes for experimentation to researchers 
because the research then becomes much cheaper to conduct.213  This in turn would 
increase the amount of research ultimately conducted on juvenile inmates.  The 
second flaw to this suggestion, is that even though juvenile prisoners will be paid the 
same rate that they would have received through other prison jobs, they are being 
paid for easier work.  Prison jobs often are accompanied by hard labor; therefore, 
juvenile inmates might want to give up their jobs for easier activities by participating 
in a research experiment.  However, one federal district court has held that where an 
adult prisoner is presented with other opportunities to make money besides 
participation in a research experiment, there is no coercion on the part of the 
researcher.214 
Situational coercion also plays a large role in the problems facing biomedical and 
behavioral research on juvenile inmates.  According to psychology principals, 
“myriad life situations” cause coercion in and of themselves without any external 
force.215  Based on this principle, all aspects that make up a juvenile prisoner’s daily 
life already have a coercive nature to them, before any inducement comes from 
researchers.  One example of situational coercion in a juvenile prisoner’s life might 
be that the prisoner currently shares a cell with a violent cellmate; that individual is 
already coerced into doing anything that may give him a single cell or the chance to 
move to another location.216  Other situational coercion might include unsanitary 
living conditions, inadequate heat or hot water, overcrowding and excess noise 
within the prison, which may cause anxiety or fear.217  All of these types of 
conditions are examples of situational coercion affecting the juvenile prisoner’s right 
to choose to participate in research voluntarily.  Even the court in Bailey, which 
found no coercion in that case, acknowledged that “where there are no opportunities 
for productive activity, research projects might offer relief from boredom.”218 
Coercion is at the core of the constitutional arguments that would be made by 
juvenile prisoners.  Unfortunately, these arguments have not been successful in the 
courts.  It has been held that constitutional remedies will not be granted if the 
subjects are granted the ability to withdraw from the experiment at any time during 
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such experiment.219  This is a major problem when the informed consent provisions of 
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) require that every consent form contain a statement informing 
subjects that they may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss 
of benefits.220  Even where there is coercion from the outset, if there is “proper” 
informed consent, containing a provision that allows for withdrawal from the 
experiment at any time, then all constitutional claims will be barred.  There appears 
to be an inherent penalty that subjects must face.  As long as that statement is 
required to be a part of informed consent by 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a), the subjects are 
barred from bringing any constitutional claims for any violations of rights based on 
coercion as the courts suggest.221  If this dilemma can be overcome, then the best 
argument for juvenile prisoners to make is a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s 
cruel and unusual punishment clause. 
Even if the Eighth Amendment argument is reached, it is also very hard to win, 
especially for a juvenile prisoner who is a subject in a research experiment.  Few 
cases have heard Eighth Amendment claims brought by prisoners who have 
participated in research experiments, but the ones that have have dismissed the 
claims.222  The courts have held that in order to show cruel and unusual punishment, 
the thing or injury that had occurred must be “shocking to the conscience” of 
mankind.223  The “cumulative impact of several prison conditions” can amount to 
cruel and unusual punishment, but even then, the combination of those conditions 
must still be shocking to the conscience of mankind.224  There have been other 
standards applied in Eighth Amendment cases involving prisoners who are not 
research participants.  One, which may be borrowed for purposes of research cases, 
is that prison officials have a duty to provide humane conditions and to take 
reasonable measures to guarantee the prisoners’ safety.225  It has also been held that, 
according to the Eighth Amendment, there must not be any “serious deprivation of 
basic human needs.”226  Another common standard is that treatment that is 
“incompatible with ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society’” violates the Eighth Amendment.227  However, no case has actually 
been heard where juvenile prisoners brought an action for violation of the Eighth 
Amendment. There is one case, from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, that held 
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that “tinkering with [one’s] mental processes” as some research does might raise 
serious constitutional questions as to cruel and unusual punishment.228 
Another major problem with bringing claims of injury resulting from 
participation in research experiments is that even if the claims are successful, the 
named defendants in the cases are often excused by what is termed “qualified 
immunity.”229  Qualified immunity applies to most researchers who either are public 
officials or who contract with the government to carry out the research.230  The 
defense was created to balance public policy concerns between protecting 
individuals’ constitutional rights and defending public officials from suits brought 
against them for every error, thereby diverting them from their public duties.231  If a 
defendant did not know or should not have reasonably known that his/her action 
would violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff, or did not take action with 
“malicious intention to cause deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to 
plaintiff,” then the qualified immunity defense will be granted to the defendant.232  
Qualified immunity has been used, in many cases, to excuse defendants for their 
violations of the subjects’ individual rights.233  No case has yet been brought in the 
federal courts involving juvenile inmates, but the same defense of qualified 
immunity could apply.  Bailey held that the preference of society not to research on 
the socially or economically underprivileged (e.g. prisoners) “does not add up to a 
presently established constitutional absolute.”234 
Juvenile prisoners who have been injured may also bring suit under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (hereinafter “FTCA”).235  Unfortunately, prisoners who have brought 
claims of injury under this tort theory have had their claims dismissed.236  The FTCA 
requires that plaintiffs exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing an 
action in the courts.237  However, in two of these cases the plaintiff prisoners 
attempted to bring an action in the administrative agency before commencing suit in 
court, and were rejected by the administrative agency which the plaintiffs 
contacted.238  The court in both cases still held that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust 
                                                                
228Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973).  
229See generally Bibeau, 188 F.3d 1105; Roach, 412 F. Supp. 521, Lee v. Armontrout, 991 
F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1993); In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796.  
230In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig. at 807.  
231Id.  
232Roach, 412 F. Supp. at 528.  See also O’Conner v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 
(1975).  
233See generally Mackey, 477 F.2d 877.  
234Bailey, 481 F. Supp. at 225.  
23528 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 (1999).  
236See McNeil v. United States Public Health Service, No. 89-1822, 1991 WL 9994 (N.D. 
Ill. Jan. 24, 1991); Wilson v. United States Public Health Service, No. 89-2163, 1989 WL 
39778 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 1989).  
23728 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1999).  
238See Wilson, 1989 WL 39778, at *1; McNeil, 1991 WL 9994, at *1.  
102 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 15:77 
their administrative remedies.239  In one of the cases, the plaintiff merely wrote a 
letter to the FDA asking for damages for the injury caused by the experiment, which 
the court held was not sufficient for exhausting his administrative remedies.240  In the 
other case, the plaintiff did file an administrative claim with the DHHS, but the claim 
was denied in a letter to the plaintiff, notifying him that he had six months to file an 
FTCA suit in court.241  The plaintiff did not meet that demand, and therefore, the 
court barred his claim for failing to meet the requirements of the administrative 
procedure.242  With these strict guidelines, juvenile inmates, who may not be able to 
afford or obtain legal assistance, will be unable to succeed on FTCA claims.   
This leads to another major problem with juvenile inmates, which is that they 
usually have no legal representation and often fail to recognize when legal 
representation is needed.243  Juvenile prisoners can hardly seek to recover under any 
of the possible claims when they cannot receive legal advice.  One suggestion is that 
the researchers and institutions that seek to conduct experiments on this particularly 
vulnerable population provide legal representation for the individual subjects.244  
However, this presents a conflict of interest where the attorney would be hired by the 
researcher, yet at the same time represent the inmate.  Again, there is a risk that the 
juveniles will not be able to comprehend what it is that the attorney is advising.   
Finally, 45 C.F.R. § 46.124 permits implementing additional protections for 
juvenile inmates.245  That section provides that “with respect to any research 
project…the department or agency head may impose additional conditions prior to or 
at the time of approval when…necessary for the protection of human subjects.”246  
This provision should be used frequently when considering research subjects who are 
juvenile inmates. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The current regulations are not enough to protect juvenile inmates from coercive 
“choices,” caused by the nature of prison and incentives used by researchers.  
However, as stated by J. Thomas Puglisi, Director of the Division of Human Subject 
Protections under the DHHS, during congressional testimony,  “We are always 
interested in improving the system to make research as safe as it can possibly be.”247  
The system needs improvement in various ways to remedy the flaws that have been 
discussed.  One of two things must occur to remedy these flaws.   
Either there must be additional protections passed by the DHHS addressing the 
specific issues of juvenile inmates, or there should be a total prohibition against 
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research on juvenile prisoners.  If additional protections are created, they should set a 
cutoff age by which only the oldest juvenile inmates may participate in research 
experiments.  Such age provisions might limit participation at age fourteen or fifteen, 
and any person below those ages would be prohibited from research experiments.  
For those individuals who are ages fourteen or fifteen and above, participation in any 
research experiment should depend on their ability to pass an informed consent test, 
which would assess the individual’s ability to understand the ramifications of any 
such experiment.  This informed consent test should be reviewed by the IRB before 
being administered to the individual.  In order for the total prohibition to be 
implemented, the subject would have to meet both the definitions of a child and a 
prisoner according to the federal regulations.  Research is still being conducted on 
juvenile inmates, as evidenced by the 1997 Stanford University study on sixty-one 
juvenile inmates, and will continue to be conducted in the future so long as it is 
possible for researchers to do so.248  Therefore, the need for these proposed changes is 
immediate. 
Researchers may be faced with the loss of a very beneficial research group if 
research experimentation is prohibited, but there are alternative groups that are just 
as beneficial.249  One example is the use of military programs such as Medical 
Research Volunteer Subjects programs.250  These types of programs involve healthy 
soldiers who are willing to participate in biomedical and behavioral research.251  
These types of programs can supply researchers with a group of healthy, well-
informed, and uncoerced subjects who require little money to participate.252  There 
are also other ways to conduct research on children who are not incarcerated to 
experiment on the same types of behavioral problems.  
The Nuremberg Code provides that subjects of research “should be so situated as 
to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element 
of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or 
coercion.”253  A population of juvenile prisoners is not so situated. 
BRIAN PAUL WYMAN 
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